Legal Defense Fund - News Articles

The Oakland Riders Case - How It Began, The Politics Behind It, Evidence At The Two Trials, Why There Were No Convictions, And Lessons To Be Learned

By Mike Rains

We have now concluded the second trial of my client, Chuck Mabanag, and of his former street-cop colleagues at the Oakland Police Department (OPD), Jude Siapno and Matt Hornung. Much like the first trial, there were no convictions, there were some acquittals (three) and the jury was hopelessly deadlocked on 13 remaining counts. I want to give you an overview of the criminal trial of the “Oakland Riders” as this case has come to be called. A fourth Oakland officer originally charged, Francisco Vasquez, failed to appear for arraignment when charges were initially filed in November 2000, and has reportedly been living in Mexico as a fugitive since that date. Needless to say, his self-initiated departure, coupled with his close working relationship with these defendants (he was frequently Siapno’s partner in an Adam Unit), coupled with prominent coverage of his “fugitive” status by the media, posed just one more in a series of obstacles which threatened the ability of the three remaining defendants to receive fair and impartial verdicts by a jury.

I have been representing police officers in criminal cases for slightly over 20 years. In all of that time, I have never had a more complex and/or time-consuming case than this one. I have had cases immersed in politics before the Riders case, but the politics were not as extensive or dirty as they were in this one. I have had cases which involved the analysis of a lot of documents. In the representation of a Corcoran correction officer a few years ago in federal court, we had to analyze over a half million documents. By contrast, this case involved an analysis of some 9,000 documents, but it also involved far more charges against the three defendants and many more underlying incidents than did the Corcoran Prison case in Fresno. I have had prosecutors out to “get” my police clients in a number of cases and trials, but never with the vengeance which occurred here. These guys were “scapegoats” in every sense of the word, but this mean-spirited Alameda County criminal “justice” system tried everything possible to keep that truth from the jurors.

Before I dig into the details about the charges involved in the two different trials of the Oakland “Riders”, let me take the opportunity on behalf of fellow attorneys Bill Rapoport and Ed Fishman, and on behalf of Mabanag, Siapno and Hornung to thank PORAC and the PORAC Legal Defense Fund for providing the defendants and defense counsel with the resources we needed to emerge from these two trials in the fashion we did. I hope that police officers who belong to COPS, or who have decided that they do not need to belong to any legal defense plan whatsoever (believing that they will never get into trouble) will read this article. In my opinion, this case would have bankrupt COPS and literally any other Legal Defense Fund Plan run even by some of the large associations we represent. No officer under any circumstances could have afforded to retain legal representation for the last 4½ years. I also hope that whoever reads this article knows and understands that the three persons who were charged with all these felonies had never been in trouble before this occurred. Mabanag had been voted by his peers as “Dog Watch Officer of the Year in 1999.” These officers were held in high regard by their peers, superiors and management at the Oakland Police Department. They received great evaluations. What’s more, they were doing what they thought department management wanted them to do when they suddenly found themselves being called “cancers” in the organization by some of the people they were trying to make look good.

LDF has a number of outstanding attorneys on its Legal Defense Fund Panel, but I can think of no better lawyers that I have ever worked with than Bill Rapoport (who represented Jude Siapno) from Redwood City, and Edward Marc Fishman (who represented Matt Hornung) from Sebastapol.

Not only did LDF provide these guys good legal counsel, but they provided us additional support when we needed it. For instance, we were able to hire a noted forensic document examiner to do an analysis of a “Draft” Internal Affairs Report which was given to us for the first time some 2½ years after it had allegedly been created, and which we believed to be (and ultimately proved to be) fraudulent. Also, when we fought hard and finally got access to a floppy disc which Sgt. Madarang had supposedly stored his final Internal Affairs Report on, we retained, with LDF’s permission, Jon Berryhill, a forensic computer analyst, to perform a forensic analysis of the disc. The analysis of that disc resulted in us seeing that there had been other documents on the disc which had been deleted and which were highly relevant to this case. Also, Berryhill’s testimony impeached testimony of Madarang, as well as Internal Affairs Sgt. Grier and Lt. Rachal, concerning the creation and retention of that disc.

Before I condemn and criticize some of those who I think are deserving of such a fate, let me indicate that I have the highest regard for the vast majority of the men and women of the Oakland Police Department (with notable exceptions to be named in this article) at all ranks and positions. I have had the honor and privilege of representing the Oakland POA and its members for about 20 years, and I consider them to be amongst the most professional, honest and courageous police officers anywhere.

Also, although I intend to criticize the way this case was prosecuted, I believe the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office is an excellent office with outstanding prosecutors and investigators possessing great integrity and capability. I don’t think the tactics and methods employed by those individuals in the desperate effort to convict these officers are representative of the vast number of prosecutors or investigators employed by Alameda County D.A.’s Office. In fact, I repeatedly told the jury that probably the most honest and professional witness they heard during the course of the trial was Norbert Chu, an Alameda County deputy district attorney whose testimony was unassailable.

I do not have the luxury in this article of providing the level of detail or supportive documentation or testimony that I would otherwise prefer. If I had my way, I would supply references to some of the testimony by citing page and line; I would have copies of some of the documentary exhibits reproduced and displayed with this article. I regret that space limitations do not permit that. I assure my reading audience that I am well armed with transcripts and documents to prove anything and everything I say in this article if someone wants to challenge me. There will be a lot of people about whom I say some unkind things. In response, I say they have earned it and they deserve it.

On June 18, 2000, Oakland Police Officer Keith Batt started his first night as a trainee working the graveyard shift under the direction of Field Training Officer Chuck Mabanag. Batt had just graduated from the 146^th Oakland Academy Class. Academy instruction included some six hours on the subject of Police Ethics and Ethical Decision Making, taught by Internal Affairs Sergeant Jeff Woods, a man of the highest ethics. Woods testified at the trial as a defense witness. He testified that he told Batt and his fellow rookies about their obligation to report misconduct committed by other officers, including their field training officer, if they saw it. Sgt. Woods’ message was clear: If you see wrongdoing, there may be different ways to deal with it, but you cannot deal with it by doing nothing - you must do something. As an aside, Batt, according to his instructors was very smart and achieved very high grades in academic subjects. On the other hand, one of the defensive tactics instructors described him as “timid and non-aggressive.”

Batt was assigned by his recruit training officer, Mary Guttormson (with the input of the training sergeant, Tony Banks) to be trained by Mabanag, an 11-year veteran cop, who had a reputation of being tough and demanding. Guttormson had described Batt in the Academy as being “mouthy and opinionated” and “lacking life experience.” She testified at trial she assigned him to work with Mabanag because Mabanag was a good, solid officer who would teach Batt that working in West Oakland on the graveyard was not like “working in Mr. Rogers’ neighborhood.” In June 2000, and for the two preceding years, Chuck Mabanag had been assigned to work patrol on the graveyard shift in west Oakland, which is predominantly African-American in ethnic population.

One of Batt’s Academy classmates, rookie Officer Steve Hewison, was also assigned to work the graveyard shift in west Oakland upon graduation from the Academy. Hewison was assigned to be trained by veteran police officer and FTO Chuck Ilacqua. When Ilacqua went on vacation in the first week of July, Hewison was temporarily assigned to work with Vasquez, which is why he ultimately ended up as part this case.

Batt had initially angered Mabanag when he failed to telephone the FTO until three nights before their first shift together to talk to him about what would be expected of him. Batt had known that he was going to be working with Mabanag for two weeks earlier. Mabanag first met Batt in the locker room before their first shift together, he immediately started poking fun at the small statured rookie.

Batt, who had grown up in Sebastapol and who had a BS in Criminal Justice from Sacramento State, probably stepped into a world of “culture shock” by being assigned to work with Mabanag on graveyard in west Oakland. But the shock didn’t end there.

Since the implementation of an aggressive crime fighting program called “Project SANE” by Oakland Police Chief Richard Word in the Fall of 1999, uniformed patrol officers working swing shifts and graveyard shifts (which had an approximate four-hour overlap) would routinely become involved in what was termed “Directed Patrol.” Certain officers would be assigned to handle calls for service while other officers would be “freed up” to “hit” the “drug hot spots” while riding in semi-marked or undercover vehicles and “sneak up” on the drug dealers in order to make contact with them and do anything possible to either arrest them or make sure they never returned again.

Over the course of the next two weeks, Batt, Mabanag and others, including defendants Jude Siapno and Matt Hornung, and other officers engaged in Directed Patrol: The officers who were willing to do this work knew they would be involved in foot chases, fights, and be more vulnerable to Internal Affairs complaints. Mabanag was continuously critical of Batt’s performance in these activities, saying he appeared to be “timid and cowardly.” He continually reminded Batt that, in the Oakland Field Training Program, the first three weeks were a “freebie”, meaning that field training officers generally would not write daily evaluations of rookies during the first three weeks. Mabanag told Batt he better get his act together very soon and before Mabanag put pen to paper.

After Batt and Mabanag had worked about 10 shifts together and just before the start of the week where Mabanag was going to start writing evaluations of Batt’s performance, Batt told Mabanag he wanted to quit. Earlier in that same shift, Batt had talked to classmate Hewison for three or four hours at the police range while Mabanag and other officers qualified with their weapons. During that conversation, Batt had told Hewison that, “I hate this shit - I’m not having any fun at all.”

During the early morning hours of July 4, 2000, Batt typed and signed a letter of resignation “for personal reasons.” He talked to Mabanag’s supervisor, Sgt. Hayter while he filled out the resignation form in Hayter’s presence. He then talked to Lt. Frank Lowe, the watch commander, and told him he wanted to resign for personal reasons. Lowe would later testify there was nothing about Batt’s demeanor to indicate that his resignation was coerced or involuntary.

Mabanag drove Batt from the police station to his private automobile located in the Police Association parking lot and the two shook hands. Batt thanked Mabanag for the training he had received and gave him a bottle of wine as an expression of thanks. That bottle became a defense exhibit in both trials.

On July 5^th, after being directed by Guttormson to come to the to the OPD to turn in equipment and for an exit interview, Batt arrived and explained to Guttormson and Training Sergeant Banks that he had actually quit because his field training officer, Mabanag, had engaged in illegal conduct and he couldn’t handle it anymore. He also implicated Siapno and Vasquez in misconduct. He made no mention of Hornung doing anything wrong in discussions with Guttormson and Banks. Batt would later admit that, shortly after submitting his resignation “for personal reasons”, he realized that, in all likelihood, his law enforcement career was over because others would say that he “couldn’t cut it” as an Oakland Police Officer.

Banks escorted Batt to Internal Affairs, where he was interviewed by Internal Affairs Sgt. John Madarang on July 5^th from approximately 10:00 a.m. until almost 6:30 p.m.

Evidence introduced at both trials proved that Batt, during his first week of working with Mabanag, was telling his friends and fellow classmates how happy he was to be working with Mabanag and that it was a “given” that Mabanag “knew what he was doing, and was a good officer.” Yet, Batt resigned and went to Internal Affairs, where he claimed that Mabanag had either personally written false police reports and/or suspect statements, or directed Batt to write false reports on three separate occasions during this first week. Prior to his resignation “for voluntary reasons”, Batt had not told anyone at the police department that Mabanag had either falsified police reports or had directed Batt to do so. Batt testified that, despite his training by Sgt. Jeff Woods, he didn’t think he could tell anyone at the OPD about allegedly witnessing improper conduct by his FTO or others for fear of reprisal. He claimed to have not remembered some of the training he had received from Woods about how he could report misconduct directly to Internal Affairs and bypass his normal “chain of command.”

When Madarang interviewed Batt on July 5^th, he listened to Batt’s claims enthusiastically and intently - and bought it all, “hook, line and sinker.” On July 7^th, Madarang placed a call to Mabanag, who was by now at home on administrative leave. He told Mabanag he better get an attorney and “save yourself - fuck Frank (Vasquez) - someone’s going down for this.” Madarang was right. Mabanag, Siapno, Vasquez - and much later - Hornung, were all “going down.”

In both the first and second trial, the majority of charges against Mabanag involved violations of Penal Code Section 118.1, making false police reports. Mabanag was also accused of violation of Penal Code Section 134, for allegedly adding false information on to suspect’s statement after the suspect signed it. Although Mabanag was not formally charged with use of excessive force during any arrest, Batt claimed that Mabanag had used more force than was necessary during the first arrest Batt and Mabanag made together, and during a second arrest made while Vasquez, Siapno and Hornung were also present. In the first trial, Mabanag was charged with four counts of “Overtime Fraud” (72 P.C.). He was acquitted on three counts and the remaining count was not re-charged in the second trial.

Siapno faced criminal charges arising out of fewer incidents than Mabanag, but the charges against him were generally more serious. Specifically, Siapno was charged with kidnap, false imprisonment, and use of excessive force against two individuals on two separate occasions while working with Vasquez. The supposed “independent” claims of the suspects (which the defense showed to be hardly “independent”) were that, after the suspects had been arrested by Siapno and Vasquez, they were taken to isolated areas, where they were beat up while handcuffed and before taken to jail.

Hornung faced less counts than either Mabanag or Siapno in both trials. The counts against Hornung alleged his preparation of false police reports. Like Mabanag, Hornung was not formally accused of using excessive force during any arrest, but Batt claimed that Hornung had repeatedly struck a suspect (Delphine Allen) while standing beside four other officers (Vasquez, Siapno, Mabanag and Batt) in the “V” of a car door. We showed the jury a photograph of the “V” of the car door in question, which would hardly accommodate a single officer, let alone five. After that photograph was shown at the first trial, Batt changed his testimony at the second trial and stated he was “mistaken” during the first trial and the officers had really done some type of “tag team” at the car door, where some officers would move in, strike the suspect and move out, and allow others to take over. This, of course, was just one of many examples of Batt’s willingness to change testimony (all with the support and assistance of the D.A.) to try to get these officers convicted of something.

The three defendants in the first trial all faced a number of separate counts of conspiracy to falsely arrest and indict in violation of Penal Code Section 182(a)(2), which related to the arrest of the various defendants. The D.A. did not allege any counts of 182(a)(2) in the second trial. However, in both trials, each defendant was accused of joining a conspiracy to obstruct justice, a violation of Penal Code Section 182(a)(5). In the second trial, the D.A. alleged that one or more of the defendants had committed 14 separate “overt acts” in furtherance of the conspiracy to obstruct justice.

Mabanag, in the first trial, was forced to deal with 15 separate incidents and events, each of which involved separate witnesses, separate evidence, separate documents, etc. This was, as I have said countless times, 15 separate trials within the trial. Siapno was forced in the first trial to deal with six separate incidents, while Hornung was forced to deal with four separate incidents. In the second trial, including the various overt acts, Mabanag had to deal with seven separate incidents/events, Siapno with three, and Hornung with two.

We appeared before different judges in the first and second trials. Our Motion to Change Venue was denied before the start of each trial. We made numerous other pretrial motions before each trial which cannot be discussed in any detail here. Following pretrial motions, the first trial, including jury selection, took a little over 13 months to complete. Jury deliberations lasted another 3½ months. It was the longest trial in Alameda County history. The second trial, including jury selection, took eight months to complete, not including pretrial motions, which lasted roughly two months. The jury deliberated a month-and-a-half.

The jury had 35 different counts to decide in the first trial; they acquitted the defense on eight and/or hung on 27 others. In the second trial, the jury had 16 separate counts to decide. They acquitted Hornung on two counts, Mabanag on one count, and were hung on the rest of the counts.

The D.A.’s Decision To Charge This Case - The First Time .... And The Second Time

This was not an “easy case” for Alameda County D.A. Thomas Orloff to deal with. Prior to this case, Orloff had charged other police officers in the county I represented, but I thought I had a good relationship with him. I respected Orloff and his judgment. Orloff’s office had always been professional and thorough in dealing with officer-involved critical incidents, and I always believed my police clients could get a fair shake from his office in evaluating their conduct in those types of matters.

I have said it before so let me say it again - I do not blame nor criticize Orloff for initially charging this case. I think he was initially given a report prepared by Madarang of the OPD, which contained a pack of lies and distortions told by former Oakland officer (now Pleasanton officer) Keith Batt. Had I been a D.A. and gotten a report that looked like that, I would have probably charged the officers too. Nevertheless, Batt and Hewison were caught in countless lies at the first trial and Madarang’s I.A. Report was thoroughly discredited. Some of the alleged “victims” testified that they were told essentially what they needed to say by the Internal Affairs investigators before a tape was turned on and they were interviewed. I think if he realized this, Orloff would not have gone forward a second time. Even city attorney, John Russo’s, dirty trick of lying to the public about the settlement of the civil suits (claiming that the city and its insurers had been required to spend almost $11 million to settle lawsuits against the three guys on trial and Vasquez) didn’t work. Had Russo told the truth, he would have told the public that the lawsuits had been filed against 44 different Oakland police officers and that the guys on trial were not even named as defendants in over half of the lawsuits. How ironic it was that Russo was named “Public Interest Lawyer of the Year” for his supposed “creative” settlement of the Riders lawsuits. He gave away all of that public money and doesn’t have a single conviction to show for it.

The prosecution’s strategy to convict these guys was not necessarily brilliant in its formation, but was quite effective in its implementation. The plan was simple: Let all potential OPD witnesses know that if you testify favorably for the prosecution, you can say anything, whether it is the truth or a blatant lie, and you will suffer no professional repercussions at all. But, if they say things helpful to the defense, their reputation for honesty will suddenly come under scrutiny by the D.A.’s Office and they may find themselves on the receiving end of an Internal Affairs investigation for the testimony they give.

The prosecution’s Witness Intimidation Program worked extremely effectively. All of the cops at OPD saw how Batt, Madarang and Hewison had been protected, given preferential assignments and/or promotions despite being caught giving perjured testimony. Simultaneously, they witnessed the demise and destruction of the careers and/or livelihoods of no less than four Oakland police officers who dared to say good things for the defendants. The D.A.’S Witness Intimidation Program made it next to impossible about the defense to find sworn police officers willing to give testimony helpful to the defendants.

I have now set “the stage” for my second “installment” of a discussion of the Riders case, which will appear in the next month’s PORAC News. In the next “round”, I will discuss the difficulty of jury selection. I also intend to discuss why the prosecution was not able to get a single conviction despite 51 separate “chances” in two separate trials. Here’s a hint - false and perjured testimony by its two “star” police officer witnesses, an Internal Affairs Report packed with lies, the production of a fraudulent Internal Affairs “Draft Report” and a few other “dirty prosecution tricks” which the defense saw and exposed. I will also talk a little about a series of disappointing judicial rulings, particularly in the second trial, which gutted our defenses and kept some of “the ugly truth” of city politics from being told to the jury.