Alford v. Superior Court (May 22, 2001)

* Court: California Appellate

* Public Agency: City of San Diego

* Plaintiff's Job Class: police officers

* Trial Court: in favor of police officers

* Appellate Court: overturns trial court

Alford Facts

* Alford and Love were arrested for possessing cocaine for sale.

* The arresting officer, Paul Phillips, in his report stated that Love had been

* The arresting officer, Paul Phillips, in his report stated that Love had been driving in an unsafe manner, causing Officer Phllips to pull him over, and that Alford did not have any ID and Love had admitted to prior convictions for weapons charges, all of which together causing Officer Phillips to do a pat-down search of Alford. Officer Phillips found a bag of cocaine on Alford. 

* Alford and Love contended that Officer Phillips was lying in his report and that there had not been probable cause to stop them. They filed a Pitchess motion, seeking complaints against Phillips about excessive force, racist remarks, or lying. 

* The trial court first granted the Pitchess motion and also ordered the issuance to Alford and Love of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of two prior complainants against Phillips; the court then changed its mind, on the ground that it could not frame an appropriate protective order. The department had argued in favor of a tight protective order, with the material to be used only in this case. The public defender’s office which represented Alford and Love wanted to be able to use the resulting information in other cause and argued that such a use was required under Brady. 

* The appellate court ruled that the Pitchess motion should have been granted and that a reasonable protective order could be framed. 

Alford Analysis

* The appellate court noted three phases under Pitchess: 

first, a motion by the defendant showing good cause and materiality; it does not take much for a defendant to make this showing; 

second, an in camera examination by the court to determine if thereare any relevant documents;

and third, a protective order issued by the court to minimize “annoyance, embarrassment or oppression”. 

* While the first phase sounds easy, the California Supreme Court in a 1989 case made a confusing hash of good cause by saying a defendant in his or her motion must provide a “specific factual scenario” to establish a “plausible factual foundation” for officer misconduct. As far as I can see, this only means that the defendant in the moving Pitchess papers needs to specify the alleged lies or alleged racist remarks or alleged excessive force that the officer allegedly committed in the incident with the defendant. 

* In this case, since Alford and Love only contended that Officer Phillips lied about the incident, they can show good cause and materiality only for past lying incidents by Officer Phillips. But they were not entitled to get anything out of his file concerning racist incidents or excessive force.

* The appellate court agreed with the trial court that two complaints in Officer Phillips’ file concerned lying.

* The appellate court rejected the trial court’s backward reasoning that, since a protective order could not be framed, the defendants were not entitled to the information. Instead, phases one and two under Pitchess were independent of phase three. 

* In addition, the appellate court concluded that a proper protective order could be drafted to fit this case. 

* The appellate court rejected defendants’ argument that, once the information is released to Alford and Love, it could be shared with any defendant, “To so interpret [the Pitchess procedure] would completely destroy the carefully crafted statutory process by which Pitchess information is released.” Instead, a tight order was appropriate, restricting the use of the disclosed information to this case.