California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (November 9, 2000)
* Court: California Appellate
* Jurisdiction: CHP
* Petitioner: CHP
* Respondent: Santa Cruz County Superior Court
* Appellate Court Decision: overturned trial court's discovery order
* Issue Areas: peace officer personnel files, Pitchess motions, good cause requirement under Pitchess motions
CHP Facts
* Luis Luna was arrested in Santa Cruz County for DUI and related offenses on January 31, 1999.
* CHP Officers McCain and Pinedo were dispatched to an abandoned BMW on State Route 1. Officer McCain observed a cracked windshield and blood on the windshield and steering wheel.
* Officers McCain and Pinedo went to a nearby gas station where CHP Officers Conley, Karsgo, and Legarra were present. Officer Karsgo had spotted two bloody individuals, Luna and Valdez.
* Officer McCain interviewed Luna, who identified himself as the driver of the BMW. Officer McCain noticed an odor of alcohol on Luna's breath, administered field sobriety tests to Luna, which Luna failed. Officer McCain then arrested Luna for DUI.
* During the course of putting Luna under arrest, Luna physically resisted and spat blood onto Officer Pinedo.
* Officer McCain wrote up a DUI report and a traffic report.
* Luna was indicted for felony DUI, felony battery of an officer, resisting arrest, and other charges.
* Luna's counsel filed a Pitchess motion in July 1999. He sought complaints of excessive force and lying. In his declaration, defense counsel alleged excessive force, based on the statement of an independent witness. The court performed an in camera review and only found a report-writing problem by Officer Conley and a time card problem by Officer McCain. The court, however, did not then order the production of those reports.
* Luna's counsel in September 1999 filed a second Pitchess motion, seeking the report on Officer Conley's report writing and the report on Officer McCain's time card problem. Luna's counsel did not submit a supplemental declaration but simply relied on his declaration for the first Pitchess motion.
* The trial court, over CHP's objection, granted Luna's motion and ordered discovery.
* CHP filed a petition for writ of mandate with the appellate court, with the appellate court ordering the trial court to vacate its September 1999 order.
CHP Analysis
* The court noted the Pitchess motion two-step procedure as set forth in Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, i.e., (1) a written motion by the defendant, with a declaration showing "good cause" and (2) an in camera examination by the trial court, with the trial court required to find that the personnel documents are relevant to the issues at trial. * As to the "good cause" requirement in the first step of a Pitchess motion, the California Supreme Court in the 1989 City of Santa Cruz case held that the defendant must advance a "specific factual scenario" (e.g., excessive force was used in my arrest) that establishes a "plausible factual foundation" for a defendant's allegations against an officer (e.g., the officer's report shows force was used).
* The California Supreme Court in the 1996 Jackson case went on to hold that the prior officer misconduct must be similar to the officer misconduct that the defendant is now alleging. So "good cause" can be shown only as to similar past misconduct, e.g., false report writing or use of coercion during interrogations. So, if a defendant claims his confession was coerced, a Pitchess motion seeking excessive force misconduct would be too broad; the defendant could only seek complaints as to coercive techniques during interrogations.
* In this case, Luna did not comply with the "good cause" requirement of a Pitchess motion as to the report on Officer Conley's report writing and the report on Officer McCain's time card problem.
* Luna did establish good cause as to excessive force, but in his second Pitchess motion he was not seeking any documents concerning as to excessive force.
* Luna also established good cause as to Officer McCain with respect to filing false police reports. But Luna is seeking this information as to Officer Conley, not Officer McCain. As to Officer Conley, Luna did not show good cause, i.e., Luna did not claim that Officer Conley prepared a false police report concerning Luna's arrest.
* As to Officer McCain, showing good cause as to filing false police reports does not extend to time card irregularities, and therefore Luna did not establish good cause as to the time card report.
* Luna also argued that the reports as to Officers Conley and McCain go to moral turpitude and are therefore discoverable.
* The court rejected this argument, saying, if it accepted the argument, then broad, open-ended discovery would have to be allowed in every case concerning any kind of moral turpitude, even instances of moral turpitude not meeting the good cause requirement of Evidence Code section 1043. To agree with this argument would effectively eliminate Evidence Code section 1043, but the court stated it could not condone such an attempt to ignore the clear mandate of a statute.